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It  is  a  pleasure  and  an  honor  to  participate  in  your 
program  today.  In  running  over  in  my  mind  the 
many  possible  topics  I  might  try  to  tackle,  I  decided 
that  perhaps  I  should  say  a  few  things  about  Federal 
Reserve  monetary  policy.  Fed  policy,  of  course,  is 
much  in  the  news  these  days.  But  aside  from  what- 
ever  immediate  impact  the  System’s  actions  may  be 
having  on  conditions  in  the  financial  markets  at  the 
present  moment,  it  seems  to  me  that  this  is  a  good 
time  to  talk  about  monetary  policy  for  a  couple  of 
reasons. 
First,  our  country  has  been  in  a  real  economic 
quandary  for  some  time  now.  To  cite  just  a  few  bits 
of  evidence,  real  GNP  grew  at  a  4.2  percent  annual 
rate  in  the  1960s,  but  it  grew  at  only  a  3.1  percent 
rate  in  the  1970s.  Employment,  in  contrast,  grew 
more  rapidly  in  the  1970s  than  it  did  in  the  1960s, 
which  means  that  we  experienced  some  decline  in 
productivity  in  the  1970s.  On  top  of  this,  economic 
activity  fluctuated  more  widely  in  the  1970s  than  in 
the  1950s  and  the  1960s.  We  suffered  three  reces- 
sions  in  the  1970s,  and  the  one  that  began  in  1973 
and  ended  in  1975  was  the  most  severe  recession 
since  the  1930s.  But  the  most  pervasive  and  in  my 
view  the  most  dangerous  problem  we  face  currently 
is  inflation.  In  the  1960s  prices  rose  roughly  25 
percent;  in  the  1970s  prices  rose  almost  100  percent. 
Moreover,  as  you  are  all  well  aware,  inflationary 
expectations  have  risen  rapidly  along  with  actual  in- 
flation.  These  expectations,  in  turn,  have  been  in- 
corporated  into  long-term  interest  rates  and  have 
helped  propel  these  rates  to  unprecedented  heights. 
Many  economists  believe  that  monetary  policy  can 
help  the  nation  achieve  a  better  economic  perform- 
ance  in  the  1980s. 
The  second  reason  that  this  is  a  good  time  to  talk 
about  monetary  policy  is  that  the  Administration  is 
trying  to  engineer  a  substantial  shift  in  both  empha- 
sis  and  direction  in  the  formulation  of  national  eco- 
nomic  policy.  This  shift  has  important  implications 
for  monetary  policy. 
Accordingly,  I  want  to  make  four  main  points  this 
morning,  and  I’ll  flag  them  so  that  you  won’t  miss 
them.  First,  I’ll  touch  lightly  on  what  might  be 
called  the  traditional  post-war  view  of  how  monetary 
policy  works.  Second,  I’ll  describe  how  I  think  this 
view  is  changing.  Third,  I’ll  share  with  you  my 
personal  view  regarding  the  proper  role  of  monetary 
policy,  and,  finally,  I’ll  give  you  my  assessment  of 
the  chances  that  the  policies  we  are  now  following 
will  contribute  to  an  actual  improvement  in  the 
nation’s  economic  performance. 
Let  me  move  then  to  my  first  point:  the  tradi- 
tional  post-war  view  of  monetary  policy.  As  you  all 
know,  there  are  several  competing  views  about  how 
the  Federal  Reserve  should  conduct  monetary  policy. 
I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  over  the  post-war  period 
as  a  whole,  the  majority  view  among  those  with  an 
interest  in  public  policy  has  been  that  the  Fed  should 
conduct  monetary  policy  by  trying  to  manage  interest 
rates.  Some  people  have  even  argued  that  the  Fed 
should  try  to  conduct  monetary  policy  with  the  ex- 
press  purpose  of  keeping  interest  rates  low  in  order 
to  stimulate  borrowing,  investment,  aggregate  de- 
mand  and  economic  growth.  Others  have  held  the 
somewhat  more  moderate  view  that  the  System 
should  adjust  interest  rates  up  or  down  as  necessary 
to  smooth  out  swings  in  the  business  cycle.  In  any 
case,  this  traditional  view  of  monetary  policy  has 
clearly  been  reflected  in  the  actual  conduct  of  policy 
over  most  of  the  last  25  years. 
2  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1981 My  second  point  has  to  do  with  recent  changes  in 
attitudes  toward  monetary  policy.  I  think  it  is  in- 
creasingly  recognized  both  by  professional  econo- 
mists  and  by  the  general  public  that  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  cannot  control  interest  rates  for  any  extended 
period  of  time,  especially  in  an  environment  with 
deeply  embedded  inflationary  expectations  such  as 
we  face  now.  If  the  Fed  tries  to  control  interest 
rates,  it  inevitably  winds  up  trying  to  move  them 
away  from  the  levels  determined  by  the  natural 
forces  of  demand  and  supply  in  the  financial  markets. 
Attempts  to  do  this,  however,  set  off  a  chain  of 
reactive  forces  in  the  markets that  eventually  drive 
rates  back  towards  their  original  levels  and  beyond 
them.  To  illustrate,  if  the  Fed  tries  to  push  rates 
below  market  levels,  it  has  to  supply  additional  re- 
serves  to  the  banking  system.  These  added  reserves 
cause  the  money  supply  to  grow  faster.  Increased 
money  supply  growth,  however,  raises  both  actual 
and  anticipated  inflation,  and  this  increase  in  ex- 
pected  inflation  puts  upward  pressure  on  interest 
rates  as  both  borrowers  and  lenders  build  this  revised 
expectation  into  nominal  rates.  As  a  result,  rates 
eventually  move  back  toward  their  original  levels 
and  then  beyond  them.  In  short,  efforts  to  manage 
interest  rates  are  counterproductive.  It  seems  to  me 
that  recent  monetary  history  provides  compelling 
evidence  that  this  is  the  way  the  world  really  works. 
Now  for  my  third  point.  If  the  Fed  cannot  effec- 
tively  manage  interest  rates  with  monetary  policy, 
what  then  can  it  do ?  The  answer  to  this  question 
should  surprise  no  one:  We  can  and  we  should 
control  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  money  supply.  I 
reach  this  conclusion  by  a  fairly  simple  route.  Most 
of  the  historical  evidence  economists  have  developed 
suggests  that  our  nation’s  real  output  can  grow  by 
about  3  percent  or  so  per  year.  It  seems  intuitively 
clear  that  the  means  of financing  this  physical  growth 
should  grow  at  about  the  same  rate  if  we  are  to 
avoid  the  development  of  inflationary  pressures  or 
recessions.  This  logic  leads  me  to  conclude  that  the 
money  supply  should  increase  at  about  3  percent  or 
so  per  year  over  the  long  run,  with  an  adjustment  to 
reflect  the  trend  rate  of  growth  in  the  velocity  of 
money. 
As  you  know,  the  Federal  Reserve  is  now  com- 
mitted  to  controlling  the  money  supply.  The  System 
annually  sets  targets  for  the  growth  of  the  monetary 
aggregates  in  the  year  ahead  in  accordance  with  the 
Full  Employment  and  Balanced  Growth  Act  of  1978 
-the  so-called  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act.  The  main 
dispute  in  this  area  these  days  is  over  the  extent  to 
which  the  Fed,  in  setting  these  objectives,  should  try 
to  anticipate  relatively  short-run  fluctuations  in  eco- 
nomic  activity  and  offset  these  anticipated  fluctu- 
ations  with  discretionary  changes  in  the  -rate  of 
growth  of the  aggregates.  I’m  increasingly  convinced 
that  no  one  can  forecast  the  business  cycle  with  much 
confidence,  and  I  don’t  think  anyone  understands 
very  well  the  short-run  impact  of  the  growth  of  the 
money  supply  on  economic  activity.  Therefore,  I 
favor  reasonably  steady,  nondiscretionary  growth  in 
the  money  supply  in  both  the  short  run  and  the  long 
run  with  appropriate  adjustments  for  long-run  trends 
in  the  velocity  of  money.  Under  such  an  approach 
money  would  serve  as  an  automatic  economic  stabi- 
lizer,  exerting  a  brake  on  inflationary  pressures  and 
serving  as  a  cushion  against  recession.  My  own 
feeling  is  that  what  we  now  call  M-1B  (currency, 
coin,  and  transactions  balances  held  by  the  public)  is 
the  best  of  the  existing  concepts  of  the  money  supply 
to  use  for  this  purpose,  but  the  choice  of  a  particular 
monetary  aggregate  is  a  secondary  matter.  The  main 
thing  is  to  choose  one  definition  of  the  money  supply 
and  then  stick  to  it. 
Finally,  with  my  preceding  remarks  as  back- 
ground,  let  me  say  a  little  about  present  and  prospec- 
tive  policy.  I’ll  divide  this  part  of  my  discussion 
into  two  subparts.  First,  why  have  we  at  the  Fed 
sometimes  failed  to  achieve  our  policy  objectives  in 
recent  years?  Second,  what  efforts  are  we  making 
to  improve  the  techniques  we  use  in  conducting 
policy  and  what  results  can  be  expected  from  these 
efforts  ? 
Why  has  our  performance  at  the  Fed  fallen  short 
of  what  we  wanted  to  achieve?  I  think  there  are 
several  reasons.  First,  it  seems  to  me  that  some 
economists  and  some  policymakers  have  been  ex- 
cessively  pessimistic  regarding  the  relative  costs  and 
benefits  of  reducing  the  long-run  rate  of  growth  in 
the  money  supply.  There  seems  to  be  a  relatively 
widespread  belief  in  some  circles  that  one  cannot 
affect  the  rate  of  inflation  significantly  in  a  short 
period  of  time  without  inducing  a  severe  recession. 
This  view  can  be  summed  up  in  the  rule  of  thumb, 
derived  from  conventional  econometric  models,  that 
one  must  give  up  10  percent  of  the  potential  growth 
in  gross  national  product  in  any  year  in  order  to 
achieve  a  1 percent  reduction  in  the  rate  of  inflation. 
Two  of  our  economists  at  the  Richmond  Fed,  Roy 
Webb  and  Tom  Humphrey,  applied  that  rule  to  the 
German  hyperinflation  of  the  early  1920s.  They 
estimated  that,  according  to  this  rule,  it  would  have 
taken  a  50  percent  GNP  gap  maintained  over  600 
centuries  to  eliminate  the  300,000  percent  inflation 
rate  witnessed  in  Germany  from  mid-1922  through 
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tion  was  virtually  eliminated  in  early  1924  at  an  esti- 
mated  loss  of only  10 percent  of potential  GNP.  Now 
this  example  is  probably  not  entirely  fair  since  by 
early  1924  the  German  public  knew  that  the  German 
government  was  serious  about  dealing  with  inflation, 
whereas  the  American  public  was  never  completely 
confident  that  policy  was  on  an  unambiguously  anti- 
inflationary  course  during  the  period  on  which  many 
of  our  econometric  models  are  based.  But  the  ex- 
ample  does  underline  the  truth  that  a  serious  commit- 
ment  to  monetary  control  can  help  reduce  inflation 
in  a  short  period  of  time  without  imposing  unaccept- 
able  social  costs  in  terms  of  lost  output.  Incidentally, 
I  think  that  the  precise  speed  with  which  we  reduce 
the  rate  of  expansion  in  the  money  supply  is  less 
important  than  removing  all  doubts  about  our  ability 
to  hit  our  monetary  targets  and  our  firm  intention 
to  do  so. 
A  second  and  perhaps  more  important  reason  why 
I  believe  we  have  not  achieved  better  results  with 
monetary  policy  in  recent  years  is  what  might  be 
called  bad  engineering.  There  is  absolutely  no  doubt 
in  my  mind  that  the  System’s  policy  objectives  have 
been  reasonable  and  attainable.  Our  execution  of 
policy,  however,  has  not  been  as  effective  as  we  in 
the  Fed  would  have  liked  it  to  be.  In  particular,  we 
have  been  hampered  by  some  institutional  flaws  in 
the  apparatus  that  we  use  to  control  the  growth  of 
the  money  supply.  In  addition,  I  think  that  some  of 
our  procedures  have  had  some  shortcomings. 
Let  me  explain  what  I  mean  by  engineering  flaws. 
As  many  of  you  undoubtedly  know,  prior  to  Oc- 
tober  6,  1979,  the  Fed  tried  to  govern  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  money  supply  by  controlling  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate.  Specifically,  we  tried  to  determine 
the  level  of  the  Federal  funds  rate  that  was  consistent 
with  our  objectives  for  the  growth  of  the  monetary 
aggregates,  and  then  we  supplied  the  quantity  of 
reserves  necessary  to  hit  that  level  of  the  funds  rate. 
But  we  were  fooled  repeatedly  because  we  simply 
did  not  have  the  empirical  information  we  needed  to 
select  a  pattern  of  Federal  funds  rates  that  would 
produce  the  desired  growth  in  the  money  supply 
consistently  over  time. 
Since  that  date  we  have  been  trying  to  control  the 
money  supply  by  controlling  the  supply  of  reserves- 
specifically,  the  supply  of  nonborrowed  reserves. 
This  procedural  change  was  important  and  was,  in 
my  judgment,  definitely  a  step  in  the  right  direction. 
As  I  indicated  a  moment  ago,  however,  our  execu- 
tion  hasn’t  always  been  as  effective  as  might  be 
hoped.  I  would  make  several  observations  in  this 
regard.  First,  the  new  procedure  implied  that  we 
would  have  to  allow  more  short-run  movement  in  the 
Federal  funds  rate  than  in  the  past.  Although  we 
have  certainly  let  the  rate  move  more  freely  than  in 
years  past,  it  seems  clear  in  retrospect  that  we  have 
not  allowed  it  to  vary  as  flexibly  as  required  to  hold 
the  growth  of  the  money  supply  under  control. 
Second,  I  do  not  think  we  have  always  adjusted  our 
nonborrowed  reserves  targets  as  quickly  and  strongly 
as  we  should  have.  Third,  the  discount  rate  weapon 
has  not  been  used  as  aggressively  as  it  might  have 
been  to  supplement  the  other  tools  for  controlling 
money  growth.  Fourth,  at  times  we  have  tended- 
often  mistakenly  as  it  has  turned  out-to  assume 
that  short-run  movements  of  the  money  supply  away 
from  their  target  paths  would  be  self-reversing. 
Last  year,  for  example,  we  did  not  react  very  quickly 
to  the  weakening  in  the  growth  of  M-1B  in  March, 
and  we  certainly  did  not  respond  nearly  strongly 
enough  to  the  upsurge  of  growth  that  began  in  June. 
Finally,  our  system  of  lagged  reserve  accounting 
creates  technical  difficulties  under  our  new  control 
procedures  that  were  not  present  when  we  were 
trying  to  control  the  money  supply  using  the  Federal 
funds  rate  as  the  operating  instrument. 
Fortunately,  there  is  a  definite  realization  within 
the  System  that  these  engineering  problems  exist, 
and  we  are  taking  actions  to  correct  them.  In  recent 
months  we  have  loosened  the  constraint  on  move- 
ments  in  the  Federal  funds  rate,  and  at  some  point 
in  the  future  I  hope  that  this  constraint  will  be  elimi- 
nated  altogether.  Further,  we  are  currently  adjusting 
our  nonborrowed  reserve  instrument  much  more 
rapidly  than  earlier,  and  there  is  also  a  possibility 
that  the  discount  rate  will  be  used  more  actively  in 
the  future  as  a  tool  for  monetary  control.  Finally,  I 
think  there  is  a  good  chance  that  we  may  soon  move 
over  to  some  form  of  contemporaneous  reserve  ac- 
counting.  I  recognize  that  there  are  some  disadvan- 
tages  to  contemporaneous  accounting  both  from  your 
standpoint  in  the  banking  industry  and  from  our 
standpoint  operationally  at  the  Fed.  Nonetheless,  it 
seems  increasingly  clear  that  some  shift  back  toward 
contemporaneous  accounting-with  some  modifica- 
tions  to  the  old  pre-1968  system  to  make  it  more 
palatable  to  you-would  reinforce  our  efforts  to 
control  monetary  growth  more  effectively. 
Taking  all  of  these  considerations  into  account,  I 
am  rather  optimistic.  I  don’t  want  to  suggest  that 
the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  has  been  perfect  so 
far  in  1981,  but  on  balance  I  think  it  represents  an 
improvement  over  events  in  1980.  I’ve  been  either 
watching  or  participating  in  Federal  Open  Market 
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seen  the  Committee  more  serious  about  hitting  its 
long-run  targets  for  money  growth.  So  I  think  we 
are  on  the  right  road,  and  if  we  can  hold  to  our 
course,  I  believe  that  most  people  will  probably  be 
surprised  by  the  speed  with  which  inflation  can  be 
brought  under  control.  Since  I  consider  inflation 
the  root  cause  of  most  of  our  other  economic  prob- 
lems,  I  believe  that  any  progress  we  make  on  the 
inflation  front.  will  yield  lower  unemployment,  higher 
productivity  and  growth,  a  stronger  balance  of  pay- 
ments,  and  lower  interest  rates.  The  trick  now  will 
be  to  hold  firm,  even  if  we  run  into  some  stormy 
economic  weather  in  the  months  immediately  ahead. 
I  can  assure  you  that  we  in  the  Federal  Reserve  will 
hold  firm,  and  I  believe  strongly  that  the  nation  will 
reap  the  benefits  of  these  policies  sooner  than  most 
people  seem  to  expect. 
INSTRUMENTS  OF  THE  MONEY  MARKET 
The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond  is pleased  to  announce  the  publication  of the 
fifth  edition  of  Instruments  of  the  Money  Market.  This  book  describes  the  major  money 
market  instruments  and  the  institutional  arrangements  of  the  markets  in  which  these 
instruments  are  traded.  Domestic  money  market  instruments  discussed  include  Treasury 
bills,  Federal  agency  securities,  Federal  funds,  repurchase  agreements,  CDs,  commercial 
paper,  and  bankers’  acceptances.  There  are  also  chapters  on  Eurodollars,  the  Federal 
Reserve  discount  window,  and  the  dealer  market  for  U.  S.  government  securities.  In 
addition,  there  is  a  chapter  on  short-term  investment  pools,  e.g.,  money  market  mutual 
funds,  which  purchase  large  amounts  of  money  market  instruments.  The  book  begins 
with  an  introductory  chapter  on  the  money  market.  Virtually  the  entire  fifth  edition 
(1981)  is  new. 
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